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Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs
This article focuses on public institutions' ability to sue in defamation. It has a
descriptive and a normative section. The descriptive part begins with an analysis
of the relevant law in several common law jurisdictions. The state of Canadian
law is then examined. The normative section considers which public institutions
should be prohibited from suing in defamation and why Whereas some case
law suggests that a prohibition on public institution defamation actions should be
grounded in the public importance of speech about such institutions, this article
takes the position that that is unprincipled. Instead, the focus is on factors such
as the nature of an institution s reputation and the dangers of public institutions
having an enforceable right to be well thought of. It is argued that a prohibition on
a broad range of public institutions is justifiable, and the merits are considered
of a rule that would deny standing to sue to all institutions subject to access to
information law.
Cet article traite de la capacit6 des institutions publiques a intenter une poursuite
en diffamation. // comporte une section descriptive et une section normative. La
partie descriptive commence par une analyse du droit pertinent dans plusieurs
ressorts de common law, suivie d'un examen du droit canadien. Dans la section
normative, I'auteure se demande a quelles institutions publiques il devrait 6tre
interdit d'intenter une action en diffamation et pourquoi. Alors que certains arr~ts
suggerent que pour une institution publique, I'interdiction d'intenter une poursuite
en diffamation doit 6tre fondde sur Iimportance, pour le public, du discours
sur ces institutions, Iauteure adopte la position que cela ne repose sur aucun
principe. Au lieu de cela, elle met I'accent sur des facteurs tels que la reputation
d'une institution et les dangers lids au fait que des institutions publiques aient le
droit exdcutoire d'6tre bien vues. Elle allegue que Iinterdiction faite a un large
6ventail d'institutions publiques est justifiable et examine le bien-fond6 d'une
regle qui nierait le droit de poursuivre en justice a toutes les institutions assujetties
aux lois sur Iacces a I'information.
* Associate Professor, University of New Brunswick Faculty of Law. I am grateful for valuable
research assistance from Bohdahna Tkachuk, Katie Duggan and Brianna Carmichael.
Hilary Young*
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3. The United Kingdom
4. Australia
5. Other common law countries
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II. A normative proposal: deny standing to sue in defamation to a broad
range of public institutions, such as those that are subject to access
to information requests
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5. Institutions subject to access to information requests
6. A total ban is justified
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Conclusion
Introduction
It is reasonably well settled in Canadian common law that governments
cannot bring defamation actions against citizens. Although there are only
trial level cases from two provinces establishing that proposition,' the
cases are consistent with each other and with the law in other common
law jurisdictions. That said, uncertainty remains about the scope of the
rule-what counts as government for the purposes of the rule. This is
because of a lack of case law, and because the few cases on point rely
on different rationales, including the chilling effect of defamation actions
on democratic discourse, the public nature of a government's reputation
and the fact that governments generally have the ability to speak out to
try to correct misinformation about themselves. This article examines the
law in other common law countries and Canada with two goals in mind:
1. Montague (Township of v Page, [2006] OJ No 331, 79 OR (3d) 515 [Montague]; Halton Hills
(Town of v Kerouac, [2006] OJ No 1473, 80 OR (3d) 577 [Halton Hills]; Dixon v Powell River (City
ofi, 2009 BCSC 406; 94 BCLR (4th) 106 [Dixon].
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first, to understand the current Canadian law with regard to governments'
and other public bodies' ability to sue in defamation, and second, to
ground a normative analysis. Specifically, it assesses how the rule against
government defamation actions should be applied to public institutions
such as school boards, police forces and Crown corporations.
Although it is unusual for federal, provincial or municipal governments
to bring defamation actions, other public institutions do bring them.2
Further, even if there were few such actions, the possibility raises
important questions about the nature of a public institution's reputation
and the role of defamation law in a modem democracy. It is presumably
for this reason that Mahoney J.A. considered the issue of whether a public
authority could sue in defamation to be one of the most important to be
decided by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in recent years. 3
The analysis supports a broad prohibition on public institution
defamation actions. Although the particular place in which the line is
drawn will always be somewhat arbitrary, one proposal for delineating the
scope of the rule is by reference to access to information law. Institutions
subject to access to information requests under federal and provincial law
could be denied standing to sue in defamation. This would not preclude
other public or political non-human entities, such as political parties, from
being denied standing to sue. Rather, it is a suggestion for one way in
which to define "public body" for the purposes of the rule against public
body defamation actions. This admittedly broad prohibition is justified
in a number of ways, but especially with regard to the nature of public
institutions' interest in reputation: the author has argued elsewhere that
non-human entities such as corporations have diminished reputational
interests and should not be entitled to sue in defamation. The argument
is even stronger in relation to public bodies. A broad prohibition is also
justified with regard to the importance of speech about such institutions,
the limitations of defamation defences in protecting speech on matters of
public interest, and the ability of public institutions to communicate with
citizens to try to correct misinformation.
The article begins by considering how various common law
jurisdictions have dealt with the issue of governments and public authorities
as defamation plaintiffs. This background helps in understanding
Canada's approach, which often references other jurisdictions' case law
2. See e.g. Hall v Regina School Division No 4 ofSaskatchewan, 2009 SKCA 118, 343 Sask R 268
[Hall]; Windsor Roman Catholic Separate School Board v Southam Inc, [1984] OJ No 3193, 46 OR
(2d) 231 [Windsor]; Kenora (Town of Police Services Boardv Savino, [1995] OJ No 486, 36 CPC (3d)
46 [Kenora].
3. Ballina Shire Council v Ringland, [1994] 33 NSWLR 680 [Ballina] at 147-148.
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but is unique by virtue of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms.
In most jurisdictions, the prohibition on government defamation actions,
including those brought by municipalities, is clear, but its application to
public institutions is much less so. Thus, in the second part of the article,
the rationales for such a prohibition are assessed, leading to the conclusion
that a prohibition on defamation actions should apply to a wide range of
public institutions.
I. Governments as defamation plaintiffs in common law jurisdictions
1. South Africa
South Africa has long prohibited defamation actions brought by
government. In Die Spoorbond and Another v South African Railways,6
a newspaper article accused the state railway of allowing trains to be
dangerously overloaded and to speed, causing a risk to public safety. The
railway alleged libel. At issue in the appeal was whether the plaintiff could
bring a defamation action at all. The South African Supreme Court of
Appeal held that, since the railway was considered to be the Crown, it
could not-at least in the absence of economic loss:
[subject to exceptions] any subject is free to express his opinion upon the
management of the country's affairs without fear of legal consequences.
I have no doubt that it would involve a serious interference with the
free expression of opinion hitherto enjoyed in this country if the wealth
of the State, derived from the State's subjects, could be used to launch
against those subjects actions for defamation because they have, falsely
and unfairly it may be, criticized or condemned the management of the
country.
The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's argument that if a
trading corporation could sue in defamation, so too could it. The Crown
was considered meaningfully different than trading corporations: its
reputation is less affected by the acts of individual decision-makers.
Rather, it is the reputations of individuals affiliated with the government
4. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
5. SouthAfrica has civil and common law traditions, but its defamation laws have much in common
with those in other common law countries.
6. Die Spoorbond andAnother v SouthAfrican Railways, [1946] 994 AD (S Afr PC) (SouthAfrica)
[Die Spoorbond].
7. Ibid at 1013.
8. Ibid at 1009: "[T]he Crown's... reputation... is not a frail thing connected with or attached to the
actions of the individuals who temporarily direct or manage some particular one of the many activities
in which the Government engages..."
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that are more likely to be injured, and these individuals maintain a right
of action.9
2. The United States
Not surprisingly, given its extensive free speech protections, the United
States also prohibits defamation actions brought by governments. In City
of Chicago v. Tribune Co, the defendant newspaper had published articles
alleging that the City of Chicago was near bankruptcy. The City claimed
this affected its "credit and financial standing." Thompson C.J. held that
governments, including municipal governments, could not sue citizens in
libel.10
The Illinois Supreme Court's ruling rested on two grounds. The
first related to the republican form of government, in which the people
are said to be sovereign. Governments are servants of the people and
the people therefore have a right to criticize them. This is in contrast to
government based on the divine right of kings." Given the sovereignty
of the people rather than the head of state, speech critical of government
enjoys an absolute privilege unless it advocates law-breaking or violent
overthrow of the government.12 The second ground was the rejection of
any distinction between criminal and civil libel. If governments cannot
hold citizens criminally responsible for libel without running afoul of the
First Amendment, neither can they sue citizens civilly. In fact, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that a civil action may be more speech-infringing
than a criminal prosecution.13
Just as the South African Supreme Court ofAppeal rejected the analogy
to trading corporations, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the government should be allowed to sue with regard to its
"private" capacity as a landowner, for example. The argument was that
the impugned statement related to Chicago's credit-worthiness, which
affected its ability to borrow money (among other consequences) in the
same way as it would affect any corporate entity. However, Thompson C.J.
held that: "no distinction can be made with respect to the proprietary and
governmental capacities of a city."" On the contrary, the more property a
government owns, the more important it is for citizens to be able to speak
freely about how that property is being managed because the potential
9. Ibid at 1005.
10. Chicago (City of) v Tribune Co, 139 NE 86 (SC IL 1923) [Chicago] at 86.
11. Ibid at 88.
12. Ibid at 90.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid at 91.
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for corruption is greater." The Court therefore held that speech about
municipal corporations enjoys an absolute privilege.1 6
Later, in New York Times Co v Sullivan, the US Supreme Court
constitutionalized libel law, holding that actual malice is required for
liability where the plaintiff is a public official (and it is now required for
all public figures)." I will return to the issue of public officials (as opposed
to institutions), but on the question of government defamation actions, the
United States Supreme Court cited Chicago stating that they are always
prohibited:
no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested,
that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American
system of jurisprudence. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307... "
It has therefore long been clear that U.S. citizens enjoy an absolute
privilege to criticize their government, including municipalities, so long
as such criticism does not amount to sedition. Further, the privilege is
guaranteed by the FirstAmendment to the U.S. Constitution. This privilege
extends to public institutions including police forces,1 9 public schools,2 0
park districts,2 1 and even public benefit pari-mutuel betting schemes.2 2
However, the cases contain little discussion of what counts as government
for the purposes of the privilege.
Whereas many other jurisdictions justify the prohibition in part
because individuals affiliated with government retain the right to sue (as
discussed below), it is not clear that that is the case in the United States. A
reference to a government body will, it seems, never constitute a reference
to one of the members or employees of that body for the purposes of the
colloquium element.2 3
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid at 90.
17. New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan]. InGertzvRobert Welch, Inc, 418
US 323 (1974) [Gertz], the court expanded the requirement of actual malice to all public figures, not
just public officials.
18. Sullivan, ibid at 291. See also at 277.
19. Edgartown Police Patrolmen 'sAssociation v Johnson, 522 F Supp 1149 (D MA 1981).
20. American Civil Liberties Union ofMinnesota v Tarek ibn ZiyadAcademy, 2009 US Dist LEXIS
114738 (D MN 2009).
21. Progress Development Corporation v Mitchell, 219 F Supp 156 (ND IL 1963).
22. Capital District Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation v Northeastern Harness Horsemen &
Association, 399 NYS (2d) 597 (1977).
23. Sullivan, supra note 17 at 292. See also Dean v Dearing, 561 SE (2d) 686 (SC VA 2002).
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3. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's leading case on government defamation actions is
Derbyshire CCv. Times Newspapers Ltd.2 4 In that case, the House of Lords
noted that there had only been two reported decisions in which a local
authority had sued in libel, neither of which dealt specifically with the issue
of whether government bodies, as such, are able to sue in defamation.2 5
In holding that governments, including local councils, could not bring
defamation actions, the House of Lords stated:
It is of the highest public importance that a democratically elected
governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to
uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation
must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech.26
The House of Lords cited Chicago with approval. Although noting the
different constitutional contexts between the United States and the United
Kingdom, the House of Lords nevertheless held that the "public interest
concerns" underlying the rule in Chicago applied equally to the United
Kingdom.2 7 Lord Keith concluded that: "not only is there no public interest
favouring the right of organs of government, whether central or local, to
sue for libel, but that it is contrary to the public interest that they should
have it."28
In response to concerns that the rule was unfair, the House of Lords
noted that individuals affiliated with government retain the right to sue in
relation to their own reputations.2 9 In addition, governments tend to have
the ability to convey their own message, and thereby attempt to correct any
misinformation.3 0 Lord Keith declined to address whether Article 10 of the
European Court of Human Rights, which protects freedom of expression,
would have led to the same conclusion.3 1 The case was decided solely on
the basis of the common law.
24. Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd, [1993] AC 534, (HL) (Eng) [Derbyshire].
25. Ibid at 544. The first case was Manchester Corporation v Williams, [1891] 1 QB 94. It held that
a local council could not succeed because corporations may only sue for libels affecting property,
whereas the claim alleged a libel affecting personal reputation. The logic was not that governments
cannot sue because they are government. Rather, it was that the allegation in question was one "of
bribery and corruption, of which a corporation cannot possibly be guilty." The second case was Bognor
Regis Urban District Council v Campion, [1972] 2 QB 169 [Bognor]. It held that a district council
could bring a defamation action but did not consider whether a local council might have different
rights than other corporations on the basis that it has governmental functions.
26. Derbyshire, supra note 24 at 547.
27. Ibid at 548.
28. Ibid at 549.
29. Ibid at 550.
30. Ibid.
31. See Derbyshire, supra note 24 at 551.
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The application of Derbyshire to public institutions other than
municipalities remains unclear. Lord Keith referred not only to the
importance of uninhibited speech about elected bodies, but also of "any
governmental body." In general, Derbyshire has been interpreted broadly.
Its prohibition on defamation actions was later applied to the British Coal
Corporation, an unelected public body, on the basis that a democratically
elected government had close control over it.3 2
Further, in Goldsmith v. Bhoyrul,3 3 the Court of Queen's Bench relied
on Derbyshire in holding that political parties cannot sue in defamation.
Although the plaintiff attempted to distinguish Derbyshire on the basis
that political parties were neither government nor elected bodies, the Court
was not persuaded. It reasoned that: "the public interest in free speech and
criticism in respect of those bodies putting themselves forward for office
or to govern is also sufficiently strong to justify withholding the right to
sue."34 As in Derbyshire, the court also noted that individuals retain the
right to sue and that political parties can "answer back."3 5
Finally, the argument that a university should not be allowed to sue
in defamation was rejected in Duke v. The University of Salford,3 6 despite
the defendant's attempt to analogize the university to a government body
per Derbyshire. Eady J. noted that it is not the government's function to
provide higher education.3 7 In support of his conclusion, Eady J cited a
case from Hong Kong:
In my judgment, the considerations which govern a body like a university
are far removed from those in the Derbyshire County Council case. In no
way does the University take part in the government of Hong Kong. It is
not an organ of government, democratically elected or otherwise. If public
interest be the test, I would hold that it strongly favours the protection of
the reputation of institutions of learning like the University.38
Interestingly, however, the action was disallowed on the grounds of
"Jameel abuse" (essentially an abuse of process) because the Court
concluded that the statements in question were really about two individuals
rather than about the university. Although it is possible to have both the
32. British Coal Corporation v National Union ofMineworkers and Another, [1996] EWHC 380
(98). See Steel vMcDonalds Corp, [1997] EWHC 366 (98) at 19 (CA 1999), which discusses British
Coal.
33. Goldsmith andAnother v Bhoyrul and Others, [1998] QB 459 (QB) [Goldsmith].
34. Ibid at 463.
35. Ibid.
36. Duke v The University ofSalford, [2013] EWHC 196 (QB).
37. Ibid at para 3.
38. Ibid at para 4 citing Hong Kong Polytechnic University v Next Magazine Publishing Ltd, [1997]
7 HKPLR 286 at 291.
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university and its employees implicated by the same statement, Eady J.
held that in this case, no "real or substantive tort has been perpetrated
against the University."3 9
4. Australia
Australia too prohibits defamation actions brought by governments and
at least some public institutions. The first case to consider the issue was
Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland,40 in which a majority of the New South
Wales Court of Appeal held that municipal councils could not sue in
defamation, although they retain the right to sue in injurious falsehood. Both
Gleeson C. and Kirby P., in concurring judgments, found the reasoning in
Derbyshire persuasive. Gleeson C. cited Lord Keith's passage: "[i]t is of
the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental
body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited
public criticism."14 He then stated that the "essence of the reasoning" in
Derbyshire was the "inconsistency between the principles which underlie
the law of defamation, and our assumptions as to the nature and role of
democratically elected governmental institutions." 42 As in Derbyshire, the
court in Ballina emphasized that any unfairness in the rule is mitigated by
the fact that natural persons affiliated with government can sue in relation
to their own reputations, and that institutions can publicize their own
views. 43
Gleeson C. explicitly declined to state whether the ruling applied
only to elected or also to unelected public bodies.4 4 He also noted that
since the plaintiff council's claim related to criticisms of its governmental
and administrative functions, the Court did not need to determine whether
public bodies were equally precluded from suing in relation to criticisms
that related to matters other than governmental and administrative
functions .4
There was a strong dissent by Mahoney JA., who rejected what he
referred to as the majority's "free speech principle" as being too broad.
In essence, he said, the court was concluding that public bodies cannot
sue in defamation because of the importance of unfettered speech about
them. If that is so, he did not see how such a principle could be confined to
elected government bodies. It would seem to apply equally to politicians
39. Ibid at para 26.
40. Ballina, supra note 3.
41. Ibid at 124.
42. Ibid at 125.
43. See ibid at 119, 135, 140, 141.
44. Ibid at 118-119.
45. Ibid at 119.
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and employees of public authorities, and would also seem to apply to
defamation claims funded by governments (those brought by government
employees, for example).4 6 Although these concerns were expressed in
dissent, they are reflected in Canadian case law and may influence the
development of that law as it applies to public institutions.
Four years later, in New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v.
Jones," the Supreme Court of New South Wales clarified some of the
uncertainty in Ballina. It interpreted the rule in Ballina as limited to
"democratically elected bod[ies] exercising governmental powers.""
Two of the three judges held that the New South Wales Aboriginal Land
Council was such a body. The majority noted that the plaintiff's functions
"include administering its funds, making grants to [other aboriginal land
councils], the acquisition of land, making claims to Crown land, and the
supervision of [other aboriginal land councils] to ensure their compliance
with the Act"4 9 It also noted that the government retained some control
over the plaintiff, that it must report to the Minister by providing budgets,
answering questions and submitting requested reports."o Handley J.A., for
the majority, therefore considered it "almost self evident that land councils
are local government bodies" within certain Australian states." As a result,
he held that the case fell within the ratio of Ballina and the plaintiff could
not bring a defamation action.
The dissenting judge, however, was persuaded by the facts that the
Council was not elected by the public at large, did not represent the Crown,
could have interests contrary to those of the Crown, and represented a
minority group that the defendants did not belong to. Therefore, not
withstanding the fact that the Council was funded from general tax
revenue, Meaghar J.A. would have held that the Council could sue.
Two other Australian legal developments are worth noting. First,
in Theophanous v. Herald Weekly Times Ltd5 2 the High Court held that
there is an implied constitutional freedom to publish on political matters.
It is unclear what this means for the ability of governments to sue, but
protecting speech about government matters now has a constitutional
dimension in Australia.
46. Ibid at 150-153.
47. New South WalesAboriginal Land Council v Jones (1998), 43 NSWLR 300 [Jones].
48. Ibid at 325.
49. Ibid at 330.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid at 331.
52. Theophanous v Herald Weekly Times Ltd, [1994] HCA 46, 182 CLR 104.
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Second, in 2006 Australian states changed their laws to prohibit trading
corporations with more than ten employees from suing in defamation.53
One of the arguments frequently made against a prohibition on defamation
actions by municipalities and other public institutions is that municipalities
are a kind of corporation that, by statute, has the rights and responsibilities
of corporations. If corporations may sue in defamation, it is argued that
so too may municipalities."4 If, however, it is no longer generally the case
that corporations may sue, the analogy to corporations does not assist
government defamation plaintiffs.
5. Other common law countries
The Indian Supreme Court has held that "the Government, local authority
and other organs and institutions exercising power" are not entitled to sue
in defamation." Other countries have extended this prohibition to state-
owned companies. The Zimbabwean Supreme Court threw out a claim
by the Post and Telecommunications Company, following South Africa's
Die Spoorbond decision.5 6 There are, however, limits to how far courts are
willing to go. As noted above, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal has held
that universities do not fall within the rule set out in Derbyshire.
6. Canada
The Canadian law with regard to governments' ability to sue in defamation
has changed over time. Until the 19th century there was no reason to think
that non-human entities, such as corporations and governments, could
bring defamation actions at all. In 1858, the UK Court of Queen's Bench
of England and Wales held that corporations could." Canada followed
suit in 1915 in Chicoutimi Pulp Co,8 which clarified that corporations
could bring defamation actions. However, the application of this rule to
governments remained unclear.
53. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 121; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 8; Defamation Act
2005 (NSW), s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (QL), s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 9; Defamation Act
2005 (Tas), s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (Victoria), s 9; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 9 [Australia
Defamation Acts].
54. See especially Bognor, supra note 25 but see also the argument considered, and rejected, in Die
Spoorbond, supra note 6.
55. RRajagopalv State of TN (1994), 6 SCC 632, 1995 AIR 264 (SC India).
56. Post and Telecommunications Co vModusPublications (Private) Ltd, No SC 199/97 (Zimbabwe,
SC).
57. John McLaren, "The Defamation Action and Municipal Politics" (1980) 29 UNBLJ 123 at 124-
125, citing Whitfield v South Eastern Railway Co (1858), 120 ER 451 (QB).
58. Price v Chicoutimi Pulp Co (1915), 51 SCR 179.
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In Prince George v. British Columbia Television System Ltd,59
which predated both the United Kingdom's Derbyshire case and the
Charter, the British Columbia Supreme Court held that municipal
governments can bring defamation actions against their citizens. The
court considered the two pre-Derbyshire U.K. authorities (Manchester
and Bognor) but noted that the matter of whether municipalities could
bring libel actions was unresolved in Canadian law.6 0 Yet whereas the
House of Lords in Derbyshire was persuaded by Chicago, the British
Columbia Supreme Court rejected the American cases because of the
different constitutional contexts in Canada and the United States.6 1
Toy J.'s reasoning in Prince George was twofold. First, municipal
corporations have reputations worthy of protection:
Just as a trading company has a trading reputation which it is entitled
to protect by bringing an action for defamation, so in my view the
plaintiffs as a local government corporation have a 'governing'
reputation which they are equally entitled to protect in the same way
- of course, bearing in mind the vital distinctionbetween defamation
of the corporation as such and defamation of its individual officers or
members. [italics in original]62
Second, there is no reason to treat municipal corporations differently
than other corporations. They do not have any "unusual rights or
immunities such as historically been the case with the provincial and
federal governing bodies"63 This suggests that the position of municipal
corporations may have been different than that of the provincial and
federal governments, although Toy J. did not elaborate.
The ratio in Prince George remained undisturbed until 2006 when
two Ontario cases held it unconstitutional for municipalities to sue in
defamation. A third case from British Columbia followed in 2009.
The reasons in Montague Township v. Page64 and Halton Hills
(Town) v. Kerouac 65 were released within a few months of each other.
Montague was a decision on a motion for summary judgment. The
defendant, who had criticized Montague Township, its councilors, reeve
and fire service, argued that the defamation action brought against him
59. Prince George v British Columbia Television System Ltd (1978), 85 DLR (3d) 755 aff'd 95
DLR (3d) 577 [Prince George].
60. Ibid at para 4.
61. Ibid at para 5.
62. Ibid at para 7, citing Bognor supra note 25 at 175.
63. Ibid at para 8.
64. Montague, supra, note 1.
65. Halton Hills, supra, note 1.
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by the Township could not succeed because it was unconstitutional for
municipalities to bring defamation actions against their citizens. The
Canadian Civil Liberties Association obtained intervenor status and also
argued that such an action unjustifiably infringes citizens' s. 2(b) Charter
rights.
For its part, the plaintiff argued that any limits on s. 2(b) rights were
justified because defamation defences such as fair comment and qualified
privilege protect citizens' ability to criticize government. Justice Pedlar
noted that there was no Ontario precedent on whether a government
can sue a citizen in defamation6 6 but held that such an action would be
unconstitutional.67 Although he did not do an explicit Oakes analysis,
Pedlar J. held that the risks outweighed the benefits of such actions. He
adopted the House of Lords' reasoning in Derbyshire, including the public
importance in not punishing or chilling speech about governments and the
mitigating fact of public officials' ability to bring their own defamation
actions.68 In addition, the Court relied on the inequality of resources
between governments and citizens and the problematic use of public funds
to finance such actions. Finally, the existence of the qualified privilege and
fair comment defences was considered insufficient to justify permitting
government defamation actions because of the onus of proof on defendants,
such that a chilling effect would remain.69
Justice Pedlar therefore granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. He effectively created a common law absolute privilege against
government defamation actions"0 on the basis that if such actions were
permitted, they would violate s. 2(b) of the Charter."1
The second post-Charter case is Halton Hills. Corbett J. stated that
his reasoning did not rely on that in Montague, as he was finalizing his
judgment when Montague was released.72 Halton Hills involved an online
news outlet that had alleged corruption against the plaintiff town. Like
Montague, Halton Hills was a summary judgment motion argued, in
part, on constitutional grounds. And like Montague, Halton Hills held it
unconstitutional for a municipal corporation to bring a defamation action.
Its reasoning, however, was different than that in Montague.
66. Montague, supra note 1 at para 15.
67. Ibid at para 27.
68. Ibid at para 28.
69. Ibid at paras 28, 29, 31, 32.
70. Ibid at para 29, 32.
71. Ibid at para 32.
72. Halton Hills, supra note 1 at para 16.
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Recall that Montague focused on the importance of democratic
discourse about governments; the inequality of resources between
government and citizens; the use of public funds to sue citizens; and the
availability of actions to individuals affiliated with government. Corbett J.
explicitly rejected the "use of public funds" argument:
I do not find it inimical to the basic principles of democracy that a
government might sue an individual for some wrong allegedly done by
that person. If (for example), a person damages public property, steals
money from the state, or commits some other wrong and causes damage
to the state, I see no reason why the state should not have recourse. To
do so it will have to expend public resources. So it is not the expenditure
of "public funds" to sue "a taxpayer" that is at issue. Rather, it is the
restriction on freedom of speech-the rendering of certain statements
made about the state actionable-that is the real mischief.73
In considering the importance of free speech, Corbett J. was more cautious
than Pedlar J. The defendant in Halton Hills had argued that because
speech about government is critical to democratic discourse, which is at
the core of the Charter's s. 2(b) protection, government defamation actions
are unconstitutional. The defendant also relied on other jurisdictions'
prohibitions on government defamation actions. 4 Corbett J. was
apparently concerned about a slippery slope. He rejected the defendant's
broad proposition, in part because the same argument could be made about
defamation actions brought by public officials or by certain corporations
(because speech about them is important to democratic discourse), but
such actions, he implies, are permissible.75 The broad argument could even
apply to prevent governments from funding their employees' defamation
actions. 76 Corbett J. was clearly not prepared to go that far. Instead, he
emphasized the unique nature of governments' reputations given that
governments are democratically elected bodies. He noted that governments
have no private reputations, only public ones. As a result, they are different
than individuals or non-government corporations.7 7 Because governments
are democratically elected, it is inherently problematic for the law to
protect their reputations. Corbett J. cited with approval the following
passage from Ballina:
to maintain that an elected governmental institution has a right to a
reputation as a governing body is to argue for the existence of something
73. Ibid at para 37.
74. Ibid at para 43.
75. Ibid at para 44.
76. Ibid at para 55.
77. Ibid at para 30.
Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs
that is incompatible with the very process to which the body owes its
existence."
He further stated: "The reason for the prohibition of defamation suits by
government... lies in the nature of democracy itself. Governments are
accountable to the people through the ballot box, and not to judges or
juries... "7 Because their reputations are wholly public, their reputations
must be defended in the public arena.so
Given this emphasis, it may be that the prohibition on defamation
actions, as envisioned by Corbett J., applies only to democratically elected
government bodies (although this does not necessarily follow). The
reasoning in Montague, on the other hand, could be interpreted to apply
more broadly.
In terms of the legal basis for the prohibition, Halton Hills is consistent
with Montague. Corbett J. states that the common law position "is that
absolute privilege attaches to statements made about government."" If
governments could sue in defamation, which they (now) cannot at common
law, this would be contrary to s. 2(b) of the Charter and not justifiable
under s. 1 of the Charter. Corbett J. thereby implies that the Charter has
altered Canadian values with regard to free speech such that a change in
the common law from the Prince George position is warranted.82
The third post-Charter case addressing whethergovernment institutions
can sue in defamation is Dixon v. Powell River (City).83 It involved a
municipality that had threatened to sue three citizens in defamation
after they criticized the city's plans for a local improvement project. The
plaintiff was John Dixon, a civil liberties advocate and concerned citizen.
Despite not being directly involved, he successfully claimed standing to
challenge the city's threats on the basis of his personal interest in receiving
the citizens' criticisms on matters of public interest.
Dixon sought declaratory relief under s. 24 of the Charter to the effect
that the city could neither threaten to sue, nor actually sue its citizens in
defamation. Garson J. granted the request for declaratory relief Her order
provided that the City of Powell River "lacks any legal basis or right to
bring civil proceedings for defamation of its governing reputation."8 4
Although she cited both Montague and Halton Hills, Garson J.'s reasoning
78. Ibid at para 48, citing Gleeson CJ inBallina, supra note 3 at 125-126.
79. Ibid at para 58.
80. Ibid at para 33.
81. Ibid at para 62.
82. Ibid at para 4.
83. Dixon v PowellRiver (City of), 2009 BCSC 406; 94 BCLR (4th) 106 [Dixon].
84. Ibid at para 49.
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appears to be based more in the democratic discourse arguments relied on
in the former than on the nature of a government's reputation, relied on in
the latter."
The three post-Charter common law cases hold that municipalities
cannot sue in defamation, but this seems not to be the case under
Quebec's civil law. In Rawdon v. Solo,86 the defendant argued that it was
unconstitutional for the plaintiff municipality to bring a defamation action,
and cited Montague and Halton Hills. The court rejected that argument,
noting that under the Civil Code, municipalities have certain rights" and
further noting that there is no separate tort of defamation in civil law. As
with civil responsibility generally, the plaintiff must prove fault, unlike in
common law defamation." The Quebec Superior Court therefore held that
the case should proceed on its merits to determine whether the defendant
acted with fault in defaming the plaintiff
Montague, Halton Hills and Dixon are the only post-Charter common
law cases involving municipalities. There are, however, a number of
cases involving other public institutions. In Wilson v. Switlo,89 the British
Columbia Supreme Court followed Dixon in holding that a band council
created under the Indian Act could not sue in defamation. Punnett J. cited
the Quebec Court of Appeal for the proposition that band councils have
similar legislative powers to municipal corporations.90 For that reason, he
held that:
it would be inconsistent with the role of the [Kitamaat Village Council],
a body that is elected democratically and exercises power through the
Indian Act, to have the capacity to maintain an action for defamation.'
Another case involving a band council is Horse Lake First Nation v.
Horseman,92 which predated Montague, Halton Hills, Dixon and Wilson.
Although the facts are somewhat unclear, the case involves defamation
and trespass actions by the First Nation against some of its members in
protesting the Horse Lake First Nation leadership. The defendants asserted
s. 2(b) Charter rights, and the Court held, as a preliminary matter, that
85. I draw this conclusion from the fact that Garson J cited the importance of free speech where
criticism of government is concerned, and did not mention the nature of a government's reputation.
See ibid at paras 46, 47.
86. Rawdon (Municipalite de) c Solo, 2008 QCCS 4573, JE 2008-2099 [Rawdon].
87. Ibid at paras 22-36.
88. Ibid at para 33.
89. Wilson v Switlo, 2011 BCSC 1287; 207 ACWS (3d) 366 [Wilson].
90. Ibid at para 128.
91. Ibid at para 130.
92. Horse Lake First Nation v Horseman, 2003 ABQB 152; 17 Alta LR (4th) 93 [Horse Lake].
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the Charter applied to the First Nation in this case because it exercises
statutory authority delegated by government in the Indian Act.93 The
logical next step would have been an action alleging that the trespass and
defamation actions breached the protesting band members' s. 2(b) Charter
rights, but there is no reported decision on point.
In Kenora (Town) Police Services Board v. Savino,94 the Kenora Police
Services Board and individual police officers brought a defamation action
against a lawyer who had alleged racism in the police force. The defendant
argued that the defamation action infringed his Charter rights. The Court
held that, notwithstanding their position of authority, the police officers
were private litigants to whom the Charter did not apply.9 5 It cited the
Ontario Court ofAppeal in Hill v. Church ofScientology for the proposition
that:
[t]he Charter is not applicable to a libel action by an employee of the
government because in pursuing the case, the employee was acting as a
private individual whose personal reputation was at issue, which did not
constitute litigation involving legislative or governmental action.96
As a result, the Charter-based argument failed in relation to the individual
officers. However, the Court noted that the Police Services Board could
not rely on the same argument. Although Kinsman J. seemed skeptical
that the Board was government for the purposes of a Charter challenge to
the Board's defamation action, he held that it was not plain and obvious
that the defendent's counterclaim disclosed no reasonable cause of action
against the Board.9 7 It does not appear that the counterclaim was ever
adjudicated on its merits.
Other defamation actions brought by public authorities are less
illuminating. In Windsor (City) Roman Catholic Separate School Board v
Southam Inc,9 8 a case from 1984, the school board alleged that an article
in the Windsor Star had libeled it. One issue was the School Board's
ability to sue in defamation. However, nothing in the reasons turned on
the Board's status as a public authority. Instead, the objections to the claim
were twofold: first, that the powers conferred on the Board by statute did
not include the right to bring a defamation action. Second, it was argued
93. Ibid at paras 11-19.
94. Kenora (Town) Police Services Board v Savino, [1995] OJ No 4314 [Kenora].
95. Ibid at para 17.
96. Ibid at para 18, citing Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1994] OJ No 961, 18 OR (3d)
385 with approval.
97. Ibid at paras 26, 27.
98. Windsor (City) Roman Catholic Separate School Board v Southam Inc, [1984] OJ No 3193, 46
OR (2d) 231 [Windsor].
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that as a corporation, the Board had no reputation to protect. Dupont J.
rejected both of these arguments, and held that the Board was entitled to
bring an action.
In Regina School Division No 4 ofSaskatchewan v. Hall,99 and Ottawa-
Carleton District School Board v. Scharf,100 there is no indication that the
school boards' ability to sue was raised.
In Saint John (City) Employees Pension Plan v. Ferguson, the Board
of Trustees of the City of Saint John Employees Pension Plan sued a city
Councilor"'1 in defamation. The action was ultimately defeated due to
the Councilor's qualified privilege, but one of the many motions in the
dispute related to the Board's ability to sue. As with Windsor, however,
the challenge was based on the Board's alleged lack of legal personality
and reputation. The issue of limits on public authorities' rights to sue in
defamation appears not to have been raised. The Court held that the Board
had both legal personality and a reputation and therefore had standing to
bring the action.
York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises102 is another case in which
the issue of the ability to bring a defamation action was not raised. I mention
it simply to show that a variety of public (or quasi-public) institutions are,
in fact, bringing defamation actions.
To summarize, no Canadian appellate court has addressed the issue
of a government's right to sue in defamation. That said, in the Charter
era, lower courts have been unanimous in holding that municipalities
cannot bring defamation actions. Further, given the trend in Canada
toward modifying defamation law to make it more consonant with Charter
values,10 3 and the fact that all other common law jurisdictions canvassed
prohibit government defamation actions, it seems unlikely that a Canadian
appellate court would hold that governments, including municipalities,
can bring defamation actions.
Although this conclusion seems unassailable, the reasoning for the
conclusion varies from case to case. Montague and Dixon rely most heavily
99. Regina School Division No 4 ofSaskatchewan v Hall, 2009 SKCA 118, 343 Sask R 268 [Hall].
100. Ottawa-Carleton District School Board v Scharf [2007] OJ No 3030, aff'd 2008 ONCA 154,
164 ACWS (3d) 368.
101. Saint John (City) Employee Pension Plan v Ferguson, 2012 NBQB 46, 387 NBR (2d) 118
[Ferguson]. In fact, one of the trustees deposed that the Board is "not a governmental entity." The
Board is established by the City of Saint John Pension Act and is funded by government but its
members are not elected by the public, the Board does not take direction from the City and its role is
to ensure the proper funding of the City employees' pension fund (ibid at para 9).
102. York University v Bell Canada Enterprises, [2009] OJ No 3689, 99 OR (3d) 695.
103. See e.g. Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61, 3 SCR 640 [Grant]; WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson,
2008 SCC 40, 2 SCR 420; and Crookes v Wikimedia Foundation Inc, 2011 SCC 47, 3 SCR 269.
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on the importance of democratic discourse, while Halton Hills emphasizes
the public nature of governmental reputation and recognizes the potential
slippery slope in a rule against government defamation actions grounded
predominantly in the importance of speech about governments.
There is uncertainty with regard to whether all statements about a
municipality are protected, or whether the statement must relate to the
city's "governing reputation." In Horse Lake, the court found that it would
be unconstitutional for the Band Council to sue in defamation in the
circumstances of the case but implied that it might not be unconstitutional
for a band council to sue in defamation in relation to purely commercial
matters.10 Whether some or all statements about government should be
protected depends in large part on why one thinks governments should
not be allowed to sue in defamation. If it is because the nature of a
government's reputation is such that it shouldn't be protected by the
courts (as in Halton Hills), then an absolute privilege for a wide range of
speech about governments would presumably be justifiable. However, if
it is because of the importance of democratic discourse (as in Montague),
then a narrower privilege applicable only to speech about governmental
matters might more easily be justified.
A further area of uncertainty is the application of the prohibition
on defamation actions to public institutions other than governments. As
noted in Halton Hills, "while the case may be clear for democratically
elected governments, it is not clear that the principle [that governments
are not allowed to sue in defamation] applies with equal force to all public
bodies.""o In one case, band councils under the Indian Act have been
analogized to municipalities and prohibited from bringing a defamation
action. Whether the prohibition applies to other public institutions in
Canada is unresolved.
The prohibition will surely be found to apply to at least some other
public bodies. This is especially likely for democratically elected bodies
like school boards, because all the rationales raised in the case law apply
to them (it is important to promote discourse about them, they have public
reputations that should be judged in the political arena rather than in
courts).
One factor that may help determine the scope of the rule is whether
the rule is viewed predominantly as grounded in the Charter or in the
104. Horse Lake, supra note 92 at para 30: "There are circumstances where the decisions of the Band
should not be subject to the Charter. For example, if the Band or Band Council is contracting with a
private party for goods or services, the relationship is one that would likely be governed by private
contract law."
105. Halton Hills, supra note 1 at para 50.
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common law. Must courts determine whether the plaintiff is government
for Charter purposes or is it enough to say that it is a public institution for
the purposes of a common law absolute privilege? Is an analysis based on
section 1 ofthe Charter required? In Kenora, the Court considered whether
the Kenora Police Services Board was government for the purposes of
Charter application. The Court doubted whether it was,106 yet if we ignore
the Charter application issue and instead focus on the rationales in cases
such as Montague and Halton Hills, it is at least arguable that police boards
are sufficiently governmental to be denied the right to sue in defamation.
Further, in other jurisdictions the prohibition has sometimes been applied
to institutions that, in Canada, would presumably not be government for
Charter application purposes, such as political parties.107
II. A normative proposal: deny standing to sue in defamation to a broad
range ofpublic institutions, such as those that are subject to access
to information requests
1. Introducing the prohibition
The first section of this article was descriptive. The second explores the
extent to which the prohibition on government defamation actions should
apply to public institutions other than federal, provincial or municipal
governments. In other words, it addresses the proper scope of the
prohibition. In so doing, it explores questions such as why a total ban
is justified and why public institutions should be treated differently than
private ones.
Terms such as "public institution," "public authority," and "government
institution" are used interchangeably. The aim is not to define these terms,
but rather to determine which public institutions should be prohibited
from suing in defamation. The terms are therefore used broadly, to include
entities controlled, in part or in whole, by governments, and institutions
whose mandates are public in part or in whole. They could also refer to
certain individuals, such as office holders, although ultimately human
beings are excluded from the scope of the proposed rule. These terms
therefore include not only democratically elected school boards, but also
Crown corporations and universities. A rule is then proposed that applies
to a subset of such institutions.
The analysis begins with the assumption, given the discussion in
section 1, that it is right to deny some public authorities the ability to sue
106. Kenora, supra note 94 at paras 26-27.
107. Goldsmith, supra note 33. The Ontario Superior Court held in McKinney v Liberal Party of
Canada et al, 1987 CanLIl 4138 (ON SC) that the Charter does not apply to political parties.
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in defamation, and ends with a proposed test that will help provide greater
certainty to litigants. That test is to deny standing to sue in defamation to
all institutions governed by access to information legislation,"os including
the federal, provincial and municipal governments. Although there is some
variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction this would tend to include school
boards, hospitals, human rights commissions, police services, universities
and Crown corporations.
The rule would apply to all entities subject to access to information
requests, but not necessarily only to such entities. In addition, political
parties and perhaps other institutions could be prohibited from bringing
defamation actions, as considered appropriate by courts or legislators.
With regard to political parties in particular, although not subject to
access to information legislation, their raison d'6tre is political and they
often wield significant influence over government. It could therefore be
argued that Canada should follow the United Kingdoml0 9 in prohibiting
defamation actions brought by political parties, although that argument is
not developed further here.
The principles underlying the proposed prohibition are by and large
the same ones relied on in Canadian case law (nature of a government's
reputation etc.) and adopting the proposed prohibition could therefore be
considered an incremental change in the law, within the competence of
the common law courts. Ideally, however, the rule would be legislated-
perhaps through an amendment to provincial defamation statutes. Although
such a legislative change seems unrealistic at present, other common law
countries have recently undertaken significant legislative reforms of their
defamation laws..o and the Law Commission of Ontario has recently begun
a defamation law reform exercise.
The rest of this introductory section summarizes the reasoning
behind the proposal. Subsequent sections set out the rationale in detail.
To summarize, although a prohibition on defamation actions depends
on the public interest in speech about governments, the public interest
in the communication cannot be the sole or even primary basis for such
108. These are sometimes also known as Freedom of Information laws. See e.g. Access to Information
Act, RSC 1985, c A-1; Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1;
Freedom ofInformation and Protection ofPrivacyAct, RSO 1990, c F.31.
109. Goldsmith, supra note 33.
110. See Australia Defamation Acts, supra note 53 and the Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26 [UK
Defamation Act].
111. Patricia Hughes, "Getting Involved 1: Defamation in the Age of the Internet" (21 October 2014),
Law Commission of Ontario, online: <www.lco-cdo.org>.
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a prohibition. Otherwise we would be justified in banning defamation
actions by politicians, CEOs, corporations and many others.
An essential distinction is that between human and non-human
plaintiffs, since defamation implicates such different reputational interests
for humans and non-humans. Thus, defamation law can legitimately treat
corporations differently than CEOs and public institutions differently
than politicians. Another important distinction is that between public and
private institutions. They differ both in the nature of their reputations and
in their relationships with the citizenry, such that defamation law should
apply differently to them. In particular, given that authority to govern is
grounded in public support, there is an inherent danger in allowing public
institutions to use the state-backed legal system to enforce a right to be
well thought of
Those institutions subject to access to information law should be
denied standing to sue in defamation because in addition to being non-
human public entities, the legislatures have identified them as institutions
about which disclosure of information is important in holding government
accountable. Finally, a complete prohibition is justified rather than simply
relying on defences. Defamation defences that seek to protect speech on
matters of public interest impose too great an onus on defendants and are
insufficient to prevent a chilling effect on speech.
2. It not only about speech on matters ofpublic interest
A prohibition on government defamation actions would be untenable if
its sole, or even predominant, justification were the public interest that
people have in unfettered communication about their public institutions.
No one doubts that such communication is important. Little needs to be
said under this heading, as people have written for centuries about the vital
importance in a democracy of the freedom to speak about governments
and their institutions. The importance of democratic discourse is one of the
rationales underlying the Charter's section 2(b) guarantee of freedom of
expression: "government by the free public opinion of an open society...
demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion
of ideas."112
That said, many things are matters of public interest. It is also vital that
people be able to speak out about the prime minister or a corporation that
is polluting a river. One might therefore question, as Mahoney J.A. did in
Ballina and as Corbett J. did in Halton Hills, whetherthere is any principled
reason to distinguish between civil servants and public authorities when it
112. Grant, supra note 103 at para 48 citing Switzman v Elbling, [1957] SCR 285 at 306.
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comes to prohibiting defamation actions. If the focus is primarily on the
public interest in such speech, no principled distinction is possible.
A public interest is perhaps necessary, but not sufficient to justify
denying governments and public institutions standing to sue in defamation.
3. It's also about being an institution
The argument that public institutions may be treated differently than
humans whose actions are of public interest relies in large part on the
different reputational interests that human beings and institutions possess.
Reputation has to do with how others think about us: it is therefore
relational.113 To answer the question of how defamation law should protect
reputation we must consider why it matters what others think of us. There
are different answers to this question. Robert Post famously categorized
reputation, for the purposes of defamation law, as implicating interests in
property, dignity and honour.' David Rolph has added to this the concept
of reputation as celebrity.1 ' Each of these conceptualizations of reputation
is open to criticism, but Post's is helpful in assessing why it might matter
what people think about their public institutions.
One reason why it matters what people think of us is that there are
professional and economic consequences of reputation. This is what Post
refers to as "reputation as property," which is akin to goodwill.116 It is a
kind of intangible property that may be possessed by human beings or
institutions. It may result from the exertion of labour and it presupposes
market-based relationships between parties since reputation as property is
valued in the marketplace. Public institutions, like corporations and human
beings, undeniably possess reputation as property. If a public institution's
reputation is diminished, it may not be able to borrow money at favourable
rates or to hire qualified staff for the same salary that it once could. This
is, of course, a loss to it-one in the nature of property. A municipality's
reputation as property is what the courts in Prince George and Bognor
sought to protect.
Another of Post's categories of reputation is reputation as honour,
which refers to the esteem in which someone is held by virtue of their
position in society. The normative characteristics of a social role are
113. See e.g. Robert Post, "The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution" (1986) 74:3 Cal L Rev 691 at 692.
114. Ibid.
115. Reputation as celebrity refers to reputations as formed by audiences based on media
representations of an individual. See David Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008) [Rolph, "Reputation"] at 178-184.
116. Post, supra note 113 at 693.
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imputed to those who fill that role, independently of any effort of dessert.1 1 7
It is therefore hierarchical rather than egalitarian. Post gives the examples
of kings and members of the military.'
Institutions, like people, may have reputation as honour. Post cites
the existence of seditious libel as an example of the law protecting the
reputation as honour of the government and its officials.1 19 I say nothing
more about reputation as honour because defamation law should not
protect reputation as honour in the 21st century.1 2 0
A third reason why it matters what people think of us is that human
beings are social creatures with dignity. When people think less of us,
our sense of self-worth is affected. We may suffer emotionally as a result,
but even apart from such suffering, we have been injured because our
membership in society has been affected, just as we can be said to be
injured by an invasion of privacy or by a trespass to the person even if we
do not suffer emotionally because of it.
The dignity interest in reputation is described differently by different
courts and scholars, but two things are clear: first, common law courts
are emphasizing the importance of the dignitary aspect of reputation, and
second, only human beings have a dignitary interest in reputation.
Courts have frequently cited the dignitary interest in reputation when
justifying defamation's protection of reputation. They describe it as a
human right similar to the right to privacy or family life. For example,
in Rosenblatt v. Baer, Stewart J. of the United States Supreme Court
considered the basis for the right to reputation to be: "the essential dignity
and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty."1 2 1 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada
in Hill v Church of Scientology stated that: "the good reputation of the
individual.. underlies all Charter rights" and "represents and reflects
the innate dignity of the individual."12 2 "The publication of defamatory
comments constitutes an invasion of the individual's personal privacy
117. Ibid at 699-700.
118. Ibid at 700, 707.
119. Ibid at 723.
120. Since reputation as honour inheres in a social role, regardless of behaviour or merit, protecting
reputation as honour is inappropriate in modem egalitarian societies that promote equality, democracy
and the rule of law. Reputation based on immutable social roles persists, but neither individuals nor
institutions should be able to insist that the law protect that reputational interest. Post, ibid at 722 ("the
concept [of honor] is inconsistent with the egalitarian principles of American democracy").
121. Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75 (1966) at 92, 679. This was dictum but was endorsedby a majority
of the US Supreme Court in subsequent cases, see e.g. Gertz, supra note 17.
122. Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130, [1995] SCJ No 64 [Hill] at
para 123.
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and is an affront to that person's dignity."123 In Editions Ecosocitd Inc.
v Banro Corp. the Supreme Court of Canada characterised Hill as having
elevated the protection of individuals' reputation "to quasi-constitutional
status." 124
On the second point, scholars agree that only human beings can have
an interest in reputation as dignity. For example, Post notes that corporate
defamation actions only make sense in the context of reputation as
property, not reputation as dignity, because they are not human beings. 125
This lack of an interest in reputation as dignity has also been cited as a
reason for either denying corporations the right to sue in defamation (as
in Australia), 126 or as a reason for applying different defamation rules to
corporations (as in the United Kingdom). 12 7 Certainly, Post suggests that
different kinds of reputational interests should be protected differently.128
These points lead to the conclusion that reputation as dignity is central
to modem defamation law, and it is not an interest that governments or
public institutions can have in their reputations. When considering why
it matters what people think about governments or public institutions, we
need not consider any dignitary interest, in the sense of a personal interest
in preserving dignity and self-worth. There is therefore good reason for
123. Ibid at para 124.
124. Editionstcosocietelnc vBanro Corp, 2012 SCC 18, [2012] SCR 636 atpara 57, [2012] 1 SCR
636, citing Hill, supra note 120 at paras 120-12 1.
125. Post, supra note 113 at 696. See also Rolph, "Reputation," supra note 115 at 98; Gary Chan,
"Corporate Defamation: Reputation, Rights and Remedies" (2013) 33:2 LS 264 at 268.
126. See Austl, NSW, Attorney General's Taskforce on Defamation Law Reform, Defamation Law:
Proposals for Reform in NSW at 13, online: <www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au> [AG Report], which refers
to Post's distinctions between different kinds of reputation. In submissions to the legislature, the New
South Wales Attorney General stated:
The submissions received by the State and Territory Attorneys General on this issue
overwhelmingly supported a complete ban on corporations suing, or allowing only non-
profit organisations to sue. The simple fact is that corporations are not people, and they do
not have personal reputations to protect-their interest is purely commercial.
Aust, NSW, Legislative Council Hansand (18 October 2005) at 18683, online: <www.parliament.
nsw.gov.au>. For scholars' views, see David Rolph, "A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation
Laws" (2008) 16:3 Torts LJ 207 at 217 and Hilary Young, "Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law as
Applied to Corporate Plaintiffs" (2013) 46:2 UBC L Rev 529 [Young, "Rethinking"].
127. For example, in committee discussions about the draft United Kingdom Defamation Act, one
recommendation, ultimately adopted in the UKDefamationAct, supra note 110 at s 1(2), was to require
corporations to demonstrate financial loss in order to succeed in a defamation action. One reason for
this recommendation was that "[c]orporate claimants have neither personal emotions nor dignity." See
UK, HC & HL, "Legislative Scrutiny: Defamation Bill -Human Rights Joint Committee Contents,"
online: <www.publications.parliament.uk>.
128. Post, supra note 113 at 721 ("By acknowledging the differences between reputation as property
and reputation as dignity, defamation law could begin the task of devising distinct doctrinal structures
appropriate to each form of reputation"). See also Young, "Rethinking," supra note 126, which argues
for the differential treatment of corporations in defamation law. Specifically, they should be denied the
right to sue.
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the law to treat human beings' and institutions' reputations differently. It
follows that a public figure doctrine,129 or similar test that would apply
equally to human and non-human plaintiffs, should be rejected.
For this reason, one could argue that it is justifiable to deny all non-
human plaintiffs access to defamation law: instead they should have to rely
on laws (existing or new) that reflect that proprietary nature of the injury.
Such laws would, for example, likely require proof of injury and perhaps
of fault-neither of which defamation law requires. No jurisdiction has
yet gone this far, and this article does not advocate such a position. It is
nevertheless an important starting point that because non-human entities
lack a dignitary interest in reputation, they have a diminished claim to the
extra protection of reputation that defamation law provides over property-
based legal protections for reputation, such as the law of injurious
falsehood.
4. It matters that the institution is public
To this point the article has provided justification for a rule that treats
human and non-human plaintiffs differently, but not for a rule that treats
public institutions differently than corporations or unions.
Many of the arguments against corporate defamation actions would
apply equally to deny all non-human plaintiffs, including governments,
standing to sue in defamation. However, even if those arguments are
not persuasive, there are additional reasons to deny standing to public
institutions specifically. This is not because speech about public institutions
is of greater public interest than speech about private ones. It has already
been suggested that this is not inherently true. Nor does the distinction
lie in the fact that public institutions in some sense belong to us and we
should therefore be allowed to defame them. Communal ownership of
public institutions does not entitle us to injure them, just as we do not
excuse vandalism of government buildings on the theory that the vandal
was destroying his own property.
Rather, the justification for applying defamation law differently to
public and private institutions is the nature of public institutions: the fact
that their existence and power depend on public support-that is, on their
reputations. Because of this, public institutions should not be allowed to
129. In the United States, defamation claims by public figures require the plaintiff to establish
actual malice (see Sullivan, supra note 17; Gertz, supra note 17). Bob Tarantino has suggested that
Canada adopt a public figure doctrine in its defamation law. Bob Tarantino, "Chasing Reputation: The
Argument for Differential Treatment of 'Public Figures' in Canadian Defamation Law" (2010) 48
Osgoode Hall LJ 595.
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use the civil justice system to try to rehabilitate their reputations or to
punish criticism.
Consider the nature of governments' and public institutions'
reputations. This subject is underexplored in the academic literature.13 0 In
cases such as Prince George, a government's reputation was analogized
to that of a corporation.1 3 1 Corporations can suffer losses as a result of
diminished reputations and so too can governments. They therefore have
valuable reputations worth protecting. For example, as was argued in City
of Chicago, the city's ability to borrow money at low interest rates might
be affected by defamation.1 3 2 So too might its ability to hire qualified staff.
In contrast, other courts have held it nonsensical to speak of
governments having a private reputation that defamation law would
protect. Gleeson C. took this approach in Ballina:
to maintain that an elected governmental institution has a right to a
reputation as a governing body is to argue for the existence of something
that is incompatible with the very process to which the body owes its
existence.'3 3
Similarly, Corbett J. stated in Halton Hills that governments have no
private reputations, only public ones.13 4
It is not contradictory to say that a government has an interest in
reputation as property and to say that protecting a government's reputation
is inconsistent with democratic process. Although courts often treat
reputation as though it were a clear and unified concept, as demonstrated
above, it is neither. Post set out three reputational interests that defamation
law implicates: property, honour and dignity. But public institutions have
an additional and important interest in their reputations. It is referred to
here as "reputation as governing power." This is the relationship between
what people think about a public institution and its ability to achieve its
public goals. It shares features of reputation as property, but is not market-
130. There is public international law and diplomacy scholarship on the importance of a state's
reputation and how that affects states' willingness to obey international law. See e.g. Rachel Brewster,
"Unpacking the State's Reputation" (2009) 50:2 Harv Intl LJ 231 and Jian Wang, "Managing National
Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited" (2006) 32:2
Public Relations Rev 91. There is also scholarship on governments' reputation in the context of
marketing and branding. See e.g. Vilma Luoma-aho, "Sector Reputation and Public Organizations"
(2008) 21:5 Intl J Public Sector Management 446. This scholarship is not especially helpful in
assessing the nature of a government's reputation for defamation purposes.
131. Prince George, supra note 59 at para 7.
132. Chicago, supra note 10 at 86.
133. Ballina, supra note 3 at 125-126. See also Halton Hills, supra note 1 at para 48.
134. Halton Hills, ibid at para 30.
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driven. It is therefore distinct from the power that comes from having
money.
If the police have a reputation for racism and abuses of power, they
may face civil disobedience or other kinds of resistance that make it harder
for them to carry out their objectives. If a city is thought to be corrupt,
it may not be able to gamer enough support to pass or enforce bylaws.
Ultimately, a government may not be re-elected or an institution may be
eliminated. Consider the Canadian Senate: its reputation is so poor that
its survival was recently in doubt despite the fact that abolishing it would
require a constitutional amendment. An injury to reputation as governing
power can prevent public institutions from achieving their goals.
This interest is in some ways similar to reputation as dignity in that
when people think less of an individual, that individual is less able to
persuade others to help her achieve her own ends. However, the inability
to achieve those ends has implications for the individual's self-worth,
suffering, and her ability to pursue a life that she considers to have value.
Those effects are all associated with human emotions and endeavours.
However, injuries to reputation as governing power have a very different
effect on institutions than injuries to reputation as dignity have on people.
Although reputation as governing power is an important and valuable
interest, it is not one that should be protected by the law of defamation.
This is because of the very nature of the relationship between governments
and citizens.
Gleeson C.J. may have had something like reputation as governing
power in mind when, in Ballina, he referred to the incompatibility between
a governing body's right to reputation and the democratic process.135
Any disputes between government and citizens about a government's
performance must be resolved by convincing the public through speech
and actions.
There are both principled and practical reasons for this: in terms
of principle, the nature of democracy is that the entitlement to govern
derives from public support and has no other basis. Public support need
not be informed or correct or fair in order to be legitimate. We do not
deny citizens the right to cast a vote, or to demonstrate peacefully in the
streets, because they have their facts wrong. Democracy requires that
people be able to form their own opinions and understanding of facts,
even if wrong, and rely on them in participating in democratic processes.
A government's legal right to a good reputation would be incompatible
with this fundamental aspect of the relationship between citizens and
135. Ballina, supra, note 3 at 125-126.
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governments. Just as a government cannot challenge a vote on the basis
that the voter was misinformed, it should not be entitled to a civil remedy
on the basis that false information prevents it from achieving its goals.
The practical reasons for not allowing governments and public
institutions access to defamation law relate to the serious consequences of
them using the courts to punish critics. If it is prima facie tortious to say
anything that would make a reasonable person think less of a government
(causing a reasonable person to think less of the plaintiff being the test of
defamation), then the government can stifle dissent by suing those who
speak out against them. This has the effect not only of punishing and
perhaps silencing specific critics, but also of chilling speech critical of
government in general. Where governments can stifle dissent, democracy
is at risk.
Of course whenever a powerful plaintiff sues critics there is the
possibility of a chilling effect with negative consequences. This is much
discussed in the literature on corporate defamation claims and SLAPP
suits, for example.13 6 The difference, however, is that governments get to
make the law. And because they need public support to stay in power,
the ability to use the law to stifle dissent has particular consequences for
democracy.
But what of a public institution's reputation as property? If, as Post
suggests, the law could protect different reputational interests differently,
why not let defamation law protect a government's reputation as property
but not its reputation as governing power? After all, we all have an interest
in ensuring that false information does not prevent our public institutions
from achieving their commercial goals. Why not, as was raised, though
not resolved, in Ballina,13 7 distinguish between criticisms that relate to
governmental and administrative functions and those that do not?
The main reason to deny public institutions standing to sue in
defamation, even with regard to criticisms of their non-governmental
functions, is that it is impossible to distinguish between an institution's
public and private affairs. What seems like a private matter (e.g., staff
hiring, investing assets) always has some public relevance. "Because
of [a municipality's] proprietary rights it does not lose its governmental
character... [N]o distinction can be made with respect to the proprietary
and governmental capacities of a city."138
136. See e.g. Young, "Rethinking," supra note 126 at 559-563; Susan Lott, "Corporate Retaliation
Against Consumers: The Status of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in
Canada" (2004), online: PIAC <www.piac.ca>.
137. Ballina, supra note 3 at 119.
138. Chicago, supra note 10 at 91.
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This section has focused on reasons why it is problematic for
governments and public institutions to be able to sue in defamation. But of
course, public institutions vary in the extent to which their goals are public
and the extent to which they are answerable to the public. The democratic
consequences discussed above are therefore presumably more a concern in
relation to a provincial government than to a university. While this is true,
the fact that public institutions are all non-human entities, combined with
their public nature (in varying degrees), goes a long way toward supporting
a broad rule denying public institutions a right to sue in defamation. The
next section elaborates on which public institutions should be denied
standing to sue in defamation and why.
5. Institutions subject to access to information requests
If a broad rule prohibiting public body defamation actions is desirable,
then all that remains is to determine its scope. There is no entirely
satisfactory answer to this problem: what counts as a public institution is,
as we shall see, difficult to determine. It is suggested below that access
to information legislation could provide a bright line test for which
institutions may sue in defamation and which may not. Although this
approach is not unproblematic, it is hoped that the proposal will generate
further discussion.
The reason why access to information legislation could help determine
the scope of the rule is that institutions subject to such laws share two
features: they are in some sense public and they are institutions about
which the government thinks citizens should be entitled to information
because it is relevant to government accountability. In fact, public access
to information about these bodies is considered sufficiently important to
justify the allocation of significant public resources to support the right of
access.
This is not, of course, to suggest that there is anything in access to
information laws that requires public institutions to be denied access to
defamation law. Rather, the point is that there is a significant overlap
between institutions subject to access to information law and those
about which free communication of information is important to holding
governments accountable.
One might object that there is a big difference between access to
government records and the right to spread lies about a public institution.
Information in the possession of government institutions may be
important regardless of its truth. For example, if an institution is basing
policy decisions on false records in its possession, that is important for the
public to know. Defamatory statements that are false or malicious do not,
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it could be argued, have such value. It is therefore unconvincing to draw
a connection between access to information and denying protection to a
public institution's reputation.
But it is not true that false statements about public institutions always
lack value in terms of democratic discourse. The Supreme Court in
Grant held that there was value in even false speech on matters of public
interest: "the first two rationales for free expression squarely apply to
communications on matters of public interest, even those which contain
false imputations."139 More importantly, the Court also stated that: "[t]he
law acknowledges through recognition of privileged occasions that false
and defamatory expression may sometimes contribute to desirable social
ends.""o Setting the right balance between free speech and reputation
means acknowledging the chilling effect the law has on valuable speech.
To avoid that chilling effect, it may be justifiable to create rules that
sometimes allow defamatory speech to go unremedied-just as the
defences of absolute and qualified privilege do.
There are admittedly problems with an approach grounded in access
to information law. The most serious is that there is no clear principle
underlying the decision to include or exclude an organization from access
to information laws. Typically, organizations are subject to those laws
for one of two reasons: either because the organization fulfills a function
that was traditionally carried out by government, or because it shares an
organizational feature of, or is regulated by, government. 1' Yet there is no
consensus on the types of organizations to which access to information law
should apply. Alasdair Roberts discusses the various ways in which access
to information laws in variousjurisdictions treat crown corporations, quasi-
governmental organizations and contractors, for example.142 Rejecting
approaches based on tradition and connection to government, Roberts
argues for one based on the negative effects of denying access.143 That is,
institutions should be subject to access to information laws if denying such
access would be sufficiently harmful. The fact remains, however, that the
criteria for inclusion in Canadian access to information laws are unclear.
A second problem with the access to information approach is that
governments decide which institutions are subject to the law and there are
incentives to keep that list as short as possible. There has lately been much
139. Grant, supra note 103 at para 52.
140. Ibid at para 30.
141. Alasdair Roberts, "Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information" (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 243 at
254.
142. Ibid at 245-251.
143. Ibid at 256.
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criticism of the need to reform access to information laws to reflect the
fact that government work is increasingly being contracted out to private
organizations. "Many public functions now are undertaken by entities that
do not conform to standards of transparency imposed on core government
ministries.""' For example, Stanley Tromp has argued that organizations
such as the Canada Pension Investment Board and Canada Blood Services
should be subject to access to information law.' It seems that the list of
entities subject to such laws is, and is likely to remain, underinclusive.
Although problematic, the proposed access to information approach
is preferable to certain alternatives, such as denying standing based on
whether an institution is elected, or based on government control, using a
test similar to that found in the law of Charter application.146
The "democratically elected" approach, as seen in Jones,' can be
difficult to apply. In that case, two judges considered it sufficient that the
New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council was elected by a segment of
the population, whereas the dissenting judge considered it relevant that
the defendant was not a member of the constituency that elected the body.
In the United Kingdom's Goldsmith' case, "democratically elected" was
extended to include political parties.
More importantly, a "democratically elected" test would exclude
many institutions of a largely public nature from the prohibition. It would
catch some school boards but presumably not police services boards or
other institutions to whom public functions have been delegated. As noted
by Baroness Hale in Jameel: "[t]hese days, the dividing line between
governmental and non-governmental organisations is increasingly
difficult to draw."149 In an era where much public work is delegated to
private or quasi-private institutions, there is significant public interest in
such institutions, even if they are not elected bodies.
A "government control" test should also be rejected. An institution
may be delegated significant power and be given public funds but may
not be controlled by government. Information about such institutions is
important to government accountability. In addition, such a test is uncertain
(how much control? what kind of control?). Of course, uncertainty in the
law is not inherently problematic, but we can do better: the value of a
144. Ibid at 244.
145. Stanley Tromp, Fallen Behind: Canada sAccess to Information Act in the World Context (2008)
[unpublished], online: <www3.telus.net/indexlOO/report> at 81.
146. McKinney v University ofGuelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229, [1990] SCJ No 122.
147. Jones, supra note 47.
148. Goldsmith, supra note 33.
149. Jameel and others (Respondents) v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (Appellants), [2006] UKHL
44 at para 158, [2007] 1 AC 359 (HL (Eng)).
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bright line test is significant, and its cost in terms of principle is arguably
negligible.
These two approaches should be rejected in favour of a broad rule
such as denying standing to institutions subject to access to information
law. Given the lack of consistency regarding which entities are subject
to access to information requests, the proposal is not unproblematic.
However, denying standing to such institutions is a starting point, and
one that offers both a rational basis (such institutions are in some sense
public and access to information about them is important to government
accountability) and an easily-applied test. Beyond this list, courts may
consider whether an institution not subject to access to information laws
should be denied standing to sue in defamation, and they can grapple with
the question of what aspects of an institution make it worthy of diminished
reputational protection.
6. A total ban is justified
Some have argued that a complete ban on defamation actions by public
institutions is overkill because defamation law contains defences that
mitigate the negative effect on democratic discourse."o These include
fair comment, qualified and absolute privilege and, now, responsible
communication on matters of public interest. The latter, which has existed
in Canadian law since 2009, protects even false speech about a matter of
public interest, so long as it was responsibly communicated.' Defamation
defences might therefore seem like an appropriate compromise between
denying standing to sue and defamation law's potentially harsh impact on
valuable speech.
In brief, a complete ban is nevertheless appropriate because: (a) even
with defences, defamation law chills and punishes valuable expression
about public institutions; (b) defamation defences place too great an onus
on defendants, such that defences insufficiently protect valuable speech;
(c) it is not even clear that defamation law is effective at vindicating
reputation, and there are alternative ways for public institutions to restore
their reputations.
Defamation is especially easy to threaten, because what counts as
defamatory is broad and because most of the onus lies with defendants.
This increases the risk of a chilling effect on speech. If people believe that
when they criticize their public institutions, they may have to engage in
150. In addition to the plaintiffs in cases such as Montague, supra note 1 and Halton Hills, supra
note 1, see Raymond Youngs, "Should Public Bodies Be Allowed to Sue in Defamation?" (2011) 16:1
Comms L 19.
151. Grant, supra note 103.
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expensive litigation with a powerful and deep-pocketed plaintiff, dissent
may be silenced even in situations where there would be nothing legally
objectionable about the speech in question.15 2 The existence of defences
will often not limit the chilling effect because of the cost of access to
justice. This was one of the reasons why the House of Lords in Derbyshire
opted for a complete ban on government defamation actions rather than
leaving courts to apply public interest defences.1 5 3
The chilling effect should not be overstated. Some people will not be
deterred from speaking out. Others may recognize that an apology and
retraction will often make a threatened claim go away. In some cases, it will
be desirable to deter people from saying defamatory things. Nevertheless,
the chilling effect of defamation law has been recognized as a problem by
the Supreme Court of Canada even outside the context of speech about
public institutions."' It is a problem to take seriously.
The second reason why defences are insufficient is that, given the
elements of defamation law and its onus of proof, people with good reasons
for speaking out may nevertheless lose their cases. Defamation law is
plaintiff-friendly: it is strict liability and presumes falsity and damages.
The burden of proving truth or another defence lies with the defendant.
It is always possible that defendants with valid claims will lose because
they are unable to afford the cost of defending or for whatever reason
cannot prove their case. For example, in Grant the Supreme Court noted
the possibility that a defendant might not be able to prove the truth of a
true statement because of a lack of evidence.1 5 5
Some of this risk has been mitigated by the new defence of responsible
communication on matters of public interest, which protects even false
speech. Raymond Youngs implies that the similar UK defence helps
strike the right balance because it only holds those responsible who act
maliciously or otherwise fail to take reasonable steps to ensure the truth
of their statement.15 6 Yet there is reason to doubt that the responsible
communication defence will adequately protect speech. First, the costs
of litigation mean that even if a defendant could succeed on the merits
of the responsible communication defence, she may prefer not to speak
at all, to apologize or to settle her claim. Second, the defence requires
152. Courts have acknowledged the chilling effect of defamation See Grant, supra note 103 at para
53; Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG), [1989] 2 SCR 1326, [1989] SCJ No 124. For more on the
chilling effect of defamation law, see Young, "Rethinking," supra note 126 at 557-558.
153. Derbyshire, supra note 24 at 547. ("The threat of civil action for defamation must inevitably
have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech.") See also ibid at 548.
154. Grant, supra note 103 at para 53.
155. Ibid at paras 56 and 65.
156. Youngs, supra note 150 at 24.
Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs
the defendant to have taken reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of
the defamatory statement. It remains to be seen how courts will interpret
this requirement. For example, Canadian courts have tended to reject the
defence unless the defendant asked for the plaintiff's side of the story, as
was generally the case in the U.K."' Third, in Canada at least, the defence
has often been interpreted as applying only to media and bloggers-not to
ordinary citizens speaking out about their governments.1 5 8
A third reason why a total ban is justified relates to the reason why a
public institution would want to sue in defamation. Presumably, it would
generally be to vindicate (that is, rehabilitate) its reputation rather than to
recover special damages or general damages. Special damages are rarely
pleaded in defamationl5 9 and general damages amounts are generally
modest for non-human plaintiffs.16 0 Deep-pocketed public institutions
do not need to sue for compensatory damages. Rather, an institution
would presumably only spend thousands of dollars of public money on a
defamation action in order to vindicate its reputation.
Yet defamation law is arguably neither necessary nor even effective
in vindicating a public institution's reputation. Whether it be through
mailouts, advertising, websites, or through the media, public institutions
already have the ability to speak to the public. This varies with the nature
of the institution: the CBC has a greater ability to reach people than a
school board has. Nevertheless, all public institutions have some capacity
to communicate with the public. This capacity should not be overstated:
some scholars have argued that institutions generally rely on the media
to get their message across and they cannot control what is conveyed.
Further, a correction by the institution may carry less weight than a court's
finding of fact.1 6 1
157. Hilary Young, "Anyone... inAny Medium? The Scope of Canada's Responsible Communication
Defence" in Andrew Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2016) 17 [Young, "Anyone"]-see specifically fn 58.
158. See generally Young, "Anyone," ibid, referring to Foulidis v Baker, 2012 ONSC 7295, 224
ACWS (3d) 521; Rubin v Ross, 2010 SKQB 249, 358 Sask R 183; and Roshard v St Dennis, 2013
BCSC 1388, 231 ACWS (3d) 834.
159. Hill, supra note 122 at para 169 ("[in libel actions,] special damages for pecuniary loss are rarely
claimed and often exceedingly difficult to prove.")
160. "That there is an entitlement to general damages which are more than nominal damages is
certain, but the amount likely to be awarded to a corporation may be small in commercial terms,
unless the defendant's refusal to retract or apologise makes it possible to argue that the only way in
which the reputation of the company can be vindicated in the eyes of the world is by way of a really
substantial award of damages." Walker v CFTO Ltd (1987), 59 OR (2d) 104, at para 26 citing Carter-
Ruck on Libel and Slander 3rd ed (Salem, NH: Butterworths, 1985) at 156-157. Although the case
was referring to corporations, the reason for a small award of general damages relates to the inability
of corporations to suffer, which is also true of public institutions.
161. Youngs, supra note 150 at 25.
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So public institutions have some ability to communicate in order to
correct misinformation about themselves, but that ability is by no means
a guarantee that they can rehabilitate their reputations on their own. It is
far from guaranteed, however, that even a successful defamation action
will rehabilitate an institution's reputation. In the context of corporate
defamation plaintiffs, the author has argued that for the plaintiff's
reputation to be vindicated, a number of things must happen: the plaintiff
must succeed, the success must depend on the falsity of the statement
(as opposed to a technicality), the victory must be publicized to the
community to whom the original defamatory statement was published,
that community must believe the verdict reflects the truth (as opposed to
an inequality of arms, for example, as in the McLibel case),1 6 2 and perhaps
significant damages must be awarded.1 6 3 In other words, the audience to
whom the plaintiff was defamed must actually change its mind about the
plaintiff. How often this actually happens is uncertain.1 6 4
7. A matter ofstanding rather than privilege
Finally, the prohibition on public institution defamation actions should
take the form of a denial of standing rather than the form of an absolute
privilege, although most of the Canadian case law to date has referred to
it as the latter.165
Whetherthe prohibition is aprivilege ora denial ofstanding would likely
rarely affect the outcome of a case. However, framing the prohibition as an
absolute privilege could cause confusion. Recall thatMontague recognizes
an absolute privilege to speak "about issues relating to government"1 6 6
while Halton Hills holds that "absolute privilege attaches to statements
made about government."1 6 7 This language refers to the subject matter of
the speech rather than the identity of the plaintiff. The focus instead should
be on the identity of the plaintiff rather than the subject matter of the
speech in question (after all, much speech about corporations is also very
important and worth protecting). A privilege based on subject matter-
namely speech about government-could conceivably apply even where
162. McDonald s Corporation v Steel & Morris, [1997] EWHC 366 (QB).
163. See Young, "Rethinking," supra note 126 at 567-569.
164. For example, see the research cited in Hilary Young, "But Names Won't Necessarily Hurt
Me: Considering the Effect of Disparaging Statements on Reputation" (2011) 37:1 Queen's U 1.
Specifically, for confirmation bias, see Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifier, "When Corrections Fail: The
Persistence of Political Misperceptions" (2010) 32:2 Political Behavior 303.
165. Montague, supra note 1 at paras 29, 32; Halton Hills, ibid at para 62. But see Ferguson, supra
note 99 at paras 15-16 (in which the court noted that while the Pension Board had legal personality,
whether it could maintain a defamation action was a question of standing).
166. Montague, supra note 1 at para 32.
167. Halton Hills, supra note 1 at para 62.
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the plaintiff is an individual affiliated with government. If, for example,
the defendant says that a city is corrupt, the mayor might have a plausible
defamation claim. Could the defendant rely on the absolute privilege to
speak about government? The proposed prohibition is not grounded in the
importance of the speech in question but in other factors unique to non-
human and public institutions.
A further point is that the scope of the privilege might be unclear,
leading to pointless debates about whether a particular statement is "about
government."
What the courts in Montague and Halton Hills actually seem to have
intended was a privilege that applied only to government plaintiffs rather
than to all speech about governments. After all, Pedlar J. in Montague
refers to "an absolute privilege against the threat of a civil action for
defamation being initiated against them by their government"168 (emphasis
added). Such a prohibition is better conceived of as a denial of standing
than as an absolute privilege. This is especially so given the important role
of qualified and absolute privilege in the law of defamation.
Privilege "is... any immunity which prevents the existence of a tort"1 6 9
and can refer to situations where "the defendant has acted to further an
interest of such social importance that it is entitled to protection, even
at the expense of damage to the plaintiff"170 However, privileges in
defamation law usually relate to occasions of speech.' Examples include
where the speech occurs (e.g. in the course of parliamentary proceedings)
or what it is about (e.g. fair reports of court proceedings). It focuses on
the defendant's immunity from suit rather than the plaintiff's lack of
justiciable interest in an action.1 72
Standing, on the other hand, is "the legal entitlement of [the entity or
person in question] to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court."1 7 3 It relates to
the right to sue in a particular instance."' This article proposes that public
institutions would simply lack standing to bring defamation actions. There
would be no need for the defendant to prove that the speech in question
168. Montague, supra note 1 at para 32 [emphasis added].
169. William Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed (St Paul: West Publishing Co, 1971) at 98.
170. Ibid.
171. See Patrick Milmo et al, eds, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 11th ed (London, UK: Thomson
Reuters, 2008) at 13.1-461 re: absolute privilege [Gatley]; Grant, supra note 103 at para 94 re:
qualified privilege.
172. Gatley, ibid at 13.1-464: "the practical effect of immunity from suit seems to be the same as that
of absolute privilege."
173. Saanich Inlet Preservation Society v Cowichan Valley (Regional District) (1983), 44 BCLR 121
at para 1.
174. Thomas Cromwell, Locus Standi: A Commentary on the Law ofStanding in Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1986) at 7.
285
286 The Dalhousie Law Journal
falls within the scope of the privilege and no debate about whether the
privilege only applies to public institution plaintiffs.
Conclusion
This article has proposed that a large number of public institutions should
be denied standing to sue in defamation. As far as the author is aware,
no court or scholar has suggested a prohibition as broad as this. And yet,
given what is actually at stake, the proposal is a relatively modest one.
Australia and the United Kingdom have recently eliminated or restricted
the ability of corporations to sue in defamation. The reasons for this include
the proprietary nature of a corporation's reputation, corporations' inability
to suffer psychologically, and their ability to rehabilitate their reputations
in other ways.' Yet the argument for prohibiting defamation actions is
even stronger in relation to governments and public institutions than it is
in relation to corporations. This is not because speech about governments
is of greater public importance but rather because of the democratic and
public nature of these institutions. If their ability to achieve their ends is
affected because of a lie, then their recourse should be in trying to convince
the public of the lie, rather than in civil litigation.
This may result in hardship: there may be circumstances in which lies
are spread about a public institution, with the result that the institution
is unfairly deprived of the ability to achieve its goals, or that it loses the
opportunity to hire the best and brightest candidates for employment.
Ultimately, however, permitting defamation actions is not a justifiable
response to this risk. This is because of the nature ofthe reputational interest
at stake, the risk to democratic participation, the ability of institutions to
find other ways to correct the record and the fact that suing in defamation
is, in any event, no guarantee of rehabilitating reputation. Existing
defences are insufficient to protect the freedom of expression interests at
stake because of the onus they place on defendants and because of their
uneven track record in protecting speech on matters of public interest.
Defamation law predates the concept of corporate legal personality.176
It was created in part to prevent blood feuds between members of the
nobility.1' Whether it could apply to protect corporate reputation
was not obvious, but corporations were eventually granted the right to
sue in defamation on the basis of their legal personality without much
consideration of their different reputational interests. Although they could
suffer no emotional injuries, they had a proprietary interest in reputation
175. AG Report, supra note 126 at 13.
176. Ibid.
177. Hill, supra note 122 at para 117.
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that was often a valuable asset. The analogy was then extended to municipal
corporations on the basis that like other corporations, they were granted,
by statute, the rights of legal persons."17 Throughout this development,
few questioned whether it actually made sense to allow public institutions
recourse to defamation law.
This is beginning to change. All the common law jurisdictions surveyed
now prohibit defamation actions by governments, including municipalities.
Courts and academics are recognizing that there are good reasons not
to treat government reputation the same way as human reputation, and
perhaps even corporate reputation. The interests at stake are significantly
different, such that the applicable laws should be different.
Although there is agreement that governments cannot sue in
defamation, it is unclear which public institutions count as government
for the purposes of the prohibition. Several guiding principles have been
suggested, such as whether the entity is democratically elected or whether
it performs traditionally governmental functions. These approaches have
certain benefits, but tend to treat what it means to be government narrowly.
Further, these approaches do little to address the uncertainty as to which
institutions can and cannot sue. Instead, this article has proposed that, as a
starting point, those entities subject to access to information law should be
denied standing to sue in defamation. They are non-human entities without
a dignitary interest in reputation. They are in some sense public and they
are all institutions about which public access to information is important
for government accountability. It follows that it is important for the public
to be able to speak about these institutions. Defamation law can pose a
serious threat to such speech, and it should have no place in resolving
disagreements about a public institution's quality or conduct.
178. See Bognor supra note 25 and Prince George, supra note 59.
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